“Information Warfare” as a Key Tool in Russia’s Foreign Policy In the Russian construct, information warfare is not an activity limited to wartime. Russian sources have the same general direction of bias as rebel sources, but with somewhat lower magnitude. Figure 1 shows these estimates, with event reports published by the OSCE as the reference category (vertical line at zero). Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND; Ph.D. Also available in print form. Tags: Cyber, RUSI Journal, Russia, Information, Technology This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). Several months later, Kyiv banned some Russian films and television programs and placed travel bans on Russian journalists. As a result of Russia’s action, the Ukraine has made a deliberate pivot away from its historic alignment with Russia to seek NATO membership. Moscow capitalized on several political errors of the The crisis in Ukraine was the largest battlefield of cyber war since Russia's cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. Where the margin of error covers zero, relative levels of coverage were similar to reports by the OSCE. Russian information operations in Ukraine do not herald a new era of theoretical or doctrinal advances, although they aim, in part, to create precisely this impression. On desktop computers and some mobile devices, you may need to download an eBook reader to view ePub files. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances — political, historical, geographical, and military — that limit their generalizability. Overall, Ukrainian information providers (blue circles) devote more news coverage to rebel violence and less to government operations than any other group of sources. [1] The term “over-report” indicates that a source reports a higher share of rebel-to-government (or government-to-rebel) attacks than the OSCE. “It is very clear that the Russian influence is a part of this … Russian irregular forces, Russian-backed forces and Russian finances are very active in eastern Ukraine,” Breedlove said. Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms. The crisis in Ukraine was the largest battlefield of cyber war since Russia's cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. I begin by defining terms a bit, because there are a few ways to think about this question. 5. russian information warfare against ukraine i: online news and social media analysis 7klv fkdswhu suhvhqwv uhvhdufk ilqglqjv rq 5xvvldq lqirupdwlrq dfwlylwlhv djdlqvw 8nudlqh edvhg rq wkh phgld dqdo\vlv 7kh uhvxowv ri wkh lqwhuylhzv duh suhvhqwhg lq &kdswhu 5.1. russia’s information warfare against ukraine vladimir sazonov, kristiina müür With a single exception—the independent, opposition-oriented Dozhd television channel, which is closer to the median Ukrainian source—Russian media report disproportionately on government violence. Ukraine has been engaged in full-fledged information warfare against Russian propaganda since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and vitalized rebellions in eastern Ukraine. The strategy of limited action outside Russia’s borders seeks to counter existing threats to Russian national interests through limited out-of-area military intervention. The lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak and vulnerable state. Ukraine and Nato team up to learn lessons from Russia's hybrid war West helps Kiev change how it fights on the battlefield and in cyberspace Sat, Oct 7, 2017, 01:00 Lessons learned from the battle of Ukraine A Ukraine Armed Forces Col. says the Russians have mastered the art of electronic warfare on the battlefield Ukrainian forces are now awash with experience fighting through and exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum. Ukraine has been engaged in full-fledged information warfare against Russian propaganda since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and vitalized rebellions in eastern Ukraine. How has Ukraine’s information war affected public attitudes toward the conflict? The following is a summary of its key findings: Beyond simply making the opponent “look bad,” these biases have implications for conflict resolution. Rebel sources predicted an even stronger pattern in the opposite direction, with government troops almost ten times more likely to unilaterally escalate than the rebels. In March 2014, before the first shots were fired in the east, Kyiv banned Russian federal broadcasters from Ukrainian television. This effort was principally a by-product of the general information campaign to convince the Russian domestic audience that Ukraine’s interim government was the result of an ille-gitimate coup. Cyberattacks had become an established tool of […] We used natural language processing and supervised machine learning to classify each event into a series of pre-defined categories, by event type, initiator, target, tactic, and casualties. Russia learned from its experience, invested in electronic warfare over the past decade and now uses the conflicts in eastern Ukraine and Syria as laboratories to test and refine those capabilities. Ukraine’s information war is not going very well. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Most sources that “over-report” government violence are based within Russia (red circles) or the self-proclaimed Peoples’ Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (DNR, LNR) (orange circles). We found that information warfare profoundly affects inferences about armed conflict, particularly about which actors are most responsible for violence. In response to these activities, its former chief rival declared that this powerful country was conducting information warfare and that the rival needed to rethink their strategy to account for this new way of conflict. I will then talk briefly about what we have seen in Ukraine, Russian activities elsewhere, and how Russians appear to RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. Ukraine: A NATO Member. In the case of outside sources like the OSCE, a news consumer or policymaker may conclude that sanctions or intervention are not necessary to reduce violence. In particular, digital information warfare is low-cost and high-impact, making it the perfect weapon of a technologically and economically weak power, like Russia. Russia was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and mobility. M Jaitner, PA Mattsson. Wary of journalists from outside Russia and the region, rebels detained several reporters on suspicions of espionage, including an American journalist with Vice News. Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered. Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine: Implications for NATO and Security in the Baltic States RUSI Journal, 24 February 2021. Research was conducted in conjunction with an MWI Contemporary Battlefield Assessment that made a broader analysis of that conflict and identified lessons on the Russian way of war. How do Russian and Ukrainian sources differ in their coverage of the Donbas conflict? RUSSIAN NON-LINEAR WARFARE IN UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA: LESSONS FOR VISEGRAD COUNTRIES Sergiy Gerasymchuk Abstract Although the issue of hybrid war with its instruments and phases is well elaborated in the academic Harvard political scientist Matthew Baum and I performed a parallel analysis of thousands of incident reports from Ukrainian, Russian, rebel, and third party sources. The characteristics of the new form of warfare Later that year, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic established an official News Agency (DAN), while multiple privately-owned pro-rebel outlets emerged to fill the regional media vacuum. In September 2014, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) raided the offices of the newspaper Vesti, accusing it of violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity through its coverage of the Donbas conflict. As practiced in Ukraine, Russian new-generation warfare is manifested in five component elements: Political subversion: Insertion of agents; classic “agitprop,” or political propaganda, information operations employing modern mass media to exploit ethnic-linguistic-class differences; corruption, compromise of local officials. (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The lessons Georgia has drawn from its 2008 war with Russia and from the Ukraine conflict have led it to focus on modes of hybrid warfare. “Information Warfare” as a Key Tool in Russia’s Foreign Policy In the Russian construct, information warfare is not an activity limited to wartime. A cyber hacking operation carried out by the Russian military intelligence agency (GR… In Ukraine, Russia’s extensive electronic warfare activities use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground systems to conduct electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming against satellite, cellular and radio communication systems along with GPS spoofing and electronic warfare attacks against Ukrainian UAVs. Between rebel and Ukrainian media, there is a much clearer separation—the “left-most” Ukrainian outlet is still to the right of the “right-most” rebel outlet. What did Russia hope to accomplish by its actions? Social. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. After seizing the Donetsk regional administration building in April 2014, one of their next steps was to take control of the television towers in the region. Multiple similar incidents ensued. Ukraine’s information war is not going very well. In response to Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions, NATO ought to expedite the Ukraine’s application for member status and, simultaneously, the Ukraine ought to open up an Information Warfare Centre of Excellence in the Ukraine. General conclusions of the report • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. Projecting these lessons into the future and more importantly, into conflicts of a different character from the one being examined, requires a … Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of improvisations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political warfare effort foundered. As practiced in Ukraine, Russian new-generation warfare is manifested in five component elements: Political subversion: Insertion of agents; classic “agitprop,” or political propaganda, information operations employing modern mass media to exploit ethnic-linguistic-class differences; corruption, compromise of local officials.

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